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Abstract—Recent advances in media creation and modification
allow to produce near realistic media assets that are almost
indistinguishable from original assets to the human eye. These
developments open opportunities for creative production of new
media in the entertainment and art industry. However, the
intentional or unintentional spread of manipulated media, i.e.,
modified media with the intention to induce misinterpretation,
also imposes risks such as social unrest, spread of rumours
for political gain or encouraging hate crimes. The clear and
transparent annotation of media modifications is considered to
be a crucial element in many usage scenarios bringing trust
to the users. This has already triggered various organizations
to develop mechanisms that can detect and annotate modified
media assets when they are shared. However, these annotations
should be attached to the media in a secure way to prevent them
of being compromised. In addition, to achieve a wide adoption
of such an annotation ecosystem, interoperability is essential and
this clearly calls for a standard. This paper presents an initiative
by the JPEG Committee called JPEG Fake Media. The scope of
JPEG Fake Media is the creation of a standard that can facilitate
the secure and reliable annotation of media asset creation and
modifications. The standard shall support usage scenarios that
are in good faith as well as those with malicious intent. This
paper gives an overview of the current state of this initiative and
introduces already identified use cases and requirements.
Index Terms—JPEG, fake media, standardisation, media cre-
ation and modification, deepfake, authenticity, media forensics
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, media assets can be modified or even entirely
synthetically created, e.g., using deep learning methods, in
such a way that they are hard to distinguish them from original
media assets to the human eye [1]. These developments open
new creative opportunities that are useful for the entertainment
industry and other business usage, e.g., creation of special
effects, artificial but photo realistic scene production with
actors in the studio or restoration/re-colourisation [2]–[4].
However, this also leads to issues relating to fake media
generation defying the integrity (e.g., deepfakes), copyright
infringements and defamation, to mention a few. Misuse of
manipulated media can cause social unrest, spread rumours
for political gain or encourage hate crimes [5]–[8].
In many application domains, the creators may want, and
even need, to declare the type of modifications that were
performed on the media asset, in opposition to other situations
where the intention is to hide the mere existence of made
manipulations. In fact, it is important to dismount the myth that
media modifications are always negative, i.e., manipulations,
as they are increasingly a normal and legal component of the
production pipeline. This is already leading various govern-
mental organizations to plan new legislation [9]. It is also true
that companies, especially social media platforms and news
outlets, are developing mechanisms that would clearly detect
and annotate manipulated media when they are shared, at-
tempting to avoid the negative impacts. While growing efforts
are noticeable in developing technologies, there is a need to
have a standardized way to annotate media assets (whatever the
intent) and securely link them together. Therefore, the JPEG
standardization committee (under hospices of ISO, IEC and
ITU) has launched an initiative to identify the standardization
needs related to the facilitation of the secure and reliable
annotation of modified media through an in-depth analysis of
various usage scenarios. While the initiative is called JPEG
Fake Media, it is important to stress that it addresses both
good faith and malicious usage scenarios. Therefore, in this
paper, the term Fake Media is used to refer to any generated
or modified media asset, independently of its ‘good’ or ‘bad’
intention, as well as media used in a misleading way.
It is expected that as a follow up of this effort, JPEG
initiates a standardization activity in order to ensure interop-
erability between a wide range of applications dealing with
fake media. To reach this goal, JPEG has and continues to
invite stakeholders to join the effort by helping to better
understand applications and scenarios relevant to fake media
use cases. This allows the JPEG committee to identify key
requirements for a standard in fake media. Initial findings
suggest that a set of standard mechanisms to annotate fake
media along with relevant information on the latter are needed.
In addition, standard mechanisms for security and protection
of integrity of media assets are desired. The latter is closely
related to issues highlighted in media blockchain which has
been under progress for a few years in JPEG [10] and therefore
is considered as a natural continuation of that effort.
It is also important to understand, in more depth, the
usage scenarios which will require input from relevant indus-
tries, public bodies (responsible for legislation), technology
providers and end-users. Therefore the JPEG Committee en-
gages with stakeholders in order to develop a clearly defined
roadmap for standardization. In this context, this paper has
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the objective of introducing the JPEG Fake Media initiative to
the relevant academic, research and industry partners, in order
to gather contributors to develop the best possible JPEG Fake
Media standard.
II. BACKGROUND
As stated previously, media modification is subject to usage
scenarios both in bad and good intents. This section discusses
some of the technological advances emerged in the recent
past including in media forensics, and media creation and
modification in creative industries.
A. Media forensics
Media forensics has become even more significant due to
recent rise in spreading of fake news. Emergence of deep
learning based manipulation, aka deepfakes, poses a new
level of challenges in forgery detection, particularly with
ready availability of software, e.g., Face2Face [11], Neu-
ralTextures [12] and FaceSwap1, which can produce near
realistic media content. The deepfake generation may involve
use of generative adversarial networks (GAN). The scale of
the problem prompted large tech companies like Google to
create deepfake dataset [13] with over 1.8 million manipulated
images for open research and multiple governmental bodies
around the world to discuss policies for law enforcement.
A handful approaches are available that use common deep
learning training [13] on images or identifying the patterns
for facial expressions and movements [14].
B. Media creation and modification in the creative industry
While deepfakes are commonly associated with of bad
intention, deep learning techniques are, in fact, increasingly
used in the creative industry from content creation to me-
dia restoration. Colourisation of archived media [4], [15] or
black and white photographs [16] shows tremendous potential
for the digitisation of pre-colour era photography or cine-
matography. Yoo et al. [3] successfully applied Convolutional
Neural Network (CNN) models for coloring animated media
/ comic sketches using limited data. Among other usage
scenarios, Virtual Reality (VR) is one of the emerging fields
where deep learning is being used for content creation and
exploration [2]. Similarly CNN have been of major use in
media restoration [17]. Further in cinematography processing
researchers and industries show the use of deep learning in
video generation through scene dynamics [18], speech driven
facial shape animation [19], image object animation [20], style
transfer to character expressions [21], creating film trailer [22]
or character motion synthesis and editing [23]. Recently, the
TV show “For All Mankind” extensively uses deepfakes to
bring characters including Johnny Carson, John Lennon, and
Ronald Reagan back to live in an alternate history story
line [24].
With such a diversity in usage scenarios, it is increasingly
important that a standardisation effort could help content cre-
ators and other stakeholders including those who are interested
1github.com/MarekKowalski/FaceSwap/
in detecting media manipulation. To this end, the Content
Authenticity Initiative2, a consortium of industry bodies aims
to “develop the industry standard for content attribution.
By augmenting subjective judgments about authenticity with
objective facts about how a piece of content came to be, the
CAI aims to help content consumers make more informed
decisions about what to trust” [25]. While the CAI focuses
on the content authenticity framework, the focus of JPEG is
on the signalling syntax for media. Both initiatives are closely
working together to enforce each other in reaching their goals.
III. DEFINITIONS
To ensure a correct understanding of the terminology used
in this paper, and to avoid any misunderstanding of concepts
and issues raised, this section provides definitions of terms
used in the context of this initiative. This will in particular to
better clarify the objectives of the JPEG Fake Media initiative.
Fake Media: any generated or modified media asset,
independent of its ‘good’ or ‘bad’ intention, as well as
media used in a misleading way.
Media asset: digital assets in form of images, videos, audio
or text including their combination; in the context of this
initiative, the main focus is on images; however, other
types of media are not necessarily excluded from the
scope.
Media asset content: the content representation of the a
media asset excluding metadata, for example the pixel
data in case of images.
Media asset metadata: data associated with the media asset
content, such as annotations or IPR information.
Media asset origin: the method or the device that was used
to create the media asset.
Misinformation: false or inaccurate information that is
communicated regardless of an intention to deceive.
Disinformation: a species of misinformation that is
deliberately deceptive.
Modification: changes made to a media asset.
Manipulation: modification with the intention to induce
misinterpretation.
Generated media asset: artificially created media asset.
Media asset integrity: lack of corruption of a media asset.
Authentic media asset: media asset that is verifiable and/or
trustworthy
2https://contentauthenticity.org/
Verifiable: able to be checked.
Trustworthy: able to be relied on as truthful.
Original media asset: media asset that has not been
modified since its origin.
Provenance: the set of information about a media asset
including (but not limited to) the media origin and trail
of modifications.
IV. USE CASES
One of the key objectives of the JPEG Fake Media initiative
is to better understand topics and use cases that fall under
its scope and to analyse their implications, especially from a
standardization point of view. At the time of this writing, the
JPEG committee has identified the following topics and use
cases:
• Misinformation and disinformation
– Deepfakes
– Manipulated media
– Media intentionally used out of context
• Forgery / Media forensics
– Document forgery (e.g., IDs and passports)
– Insurance fraud (e.g., pictures of accidents)
– KYC (Know Your Customer) (e.g., fake identity)
– Impostoring (e.g., impersonating a celebrity)
• Media creation
– Use of deepfakes for special effects
– Green screens, media processing and composition
– GAN (Generative Adversarial Network) images
– Short content bursts
– UGC (User Generated Content) e.g., TikTok, Triller,
Adobe Spark
– Media tracing, e.g., provenance, content versioning,
context
– Picture and movies production
• Media modification
– Image editing software
– Movie preservation
– Film enhancement
– Restoration of old movies
Based on the above, the following sections provide an
overview of illustrative use cases. Both the topics and use
cases will be extended in the future based on future feedback
and contribution from stakeholders.
A. Misinformation and disinformation
Media usage in breaking news: In his/her coverage, a jour-
nalist wants to use images from a social media post
depicting police violence during protests. The journalist
has to make a fast decision but, naturally, he/she wants
to be sure the image in the post is genuine and taken at
the mentioned place and time.
Deepfake detection: A news host wants to double check if
a video he/she received of the president making question-
able claims is genuine and not a deepfake.
Content authenticity checking: An investigative journalist
wants to verify if an image depicting past atrocities is
actually from that era and place. Such investigations
may also pertain to ongoing investigations where human
rights staff are receiving media from anonymous sources
and need to check whether the depicted atrocities/human
rights violations have indeed happened in order to further
escalate the investigation.
Content usage tracing: A photographer wants to find out
where and how some of the images from his portfolio
have been used and check whether they are used in a
genuine context.
Academic research: An academic journal reviewer might
want to know if an image used as evidence for a suc-
cessful experiment hasn’t been altered and is accurate.
Photographic framing: A journalist received images of the
Grand Place in Brussels in the aftermath of the terrorist
attacks. Due to the specific framing, the images give a
frightening impression of the situation. Therefore, the
journalist wants to compare with other images taken at
the same place and time but from different perspectives
to better evaluate the actual situation.
B. Forgery/media forensics
Insurance fraud: In the context of insurance fraud, an in-
surer might want to check whether an image used as
evidence of an accident has not been manipulated.
Mileage reporting photo: A car insurance company pro-
vides a discount program for the customer of limited
annual mileage and demands the annual-reporting photo
showing the mileage and the time displayed on the front
panel of the customer’s car. This insurance company
might want to check whether the photo reported has not
been manipulated.
Photo for cost charge: A series of before and after photos
is frequently used for charging repair-costs in modern
digital society. In this case, the integrity of a series of
photos with the timing information from the origin to the
final needs to be authenticated.
Evidence of trial: A prosecutor wants to verify whether a
movie recorded by a Closed Circuit TV Security System
was really taken at the location and the time claimed.
Media sharing on social media: A media consumer (end
user) wants to verify the credibility of a news article
shared on a social media and he/she would like to
trace who created, modified and published an image
included in it. An additional check that the end user
would be interested in is to verify if the user account
profile picture is authentic or synthetically generated
from an AI model (e.g., StyleGAN like that used by
thispersondoesnotexist.com).
Credibility of AI training image data sets: Online
auction service buys a set of training image data from a
stock photo service and wants to check if each image
was really taken by a camera instead of being created
synthetically.
C. Media creation
Movie special effects: A creative movie production com-
pany has created several shots for a movie that are
computer generated but almost indistinguishable from
real footage. The footage is labeled to allow consumers
to identify that the content is computer generated. Since
the final movie is a composition of generated and real
footage, the entire movie can be labeled frame by frame.
Media transcoding: A photographer develops multiple ver-
sions of an image for different purposes. This includes
the camera RAW image, rendered JPEG, moderately
enhanced image and several versions with varying quality
for web preview or print. During each transcoding step,
authenticity and IPR information is retained from the par-
ent version to the child version. In addition, authenticity
information might be updated to describe modifications
inherent to the transcoding process such as loss of quality
when transcoding to a lossy format.
Chroma keying or silhouette extraction: Using chroma
keying or silhouette extraction, a reporter can be virtually
placed in a different location. Labeling the content allows
media consumers to identify whether the shots were
actually taken at the location or not.
D. Media modification
Image colorization and restoration: A developer has cre-
ated an algorithm that uses deep learning to colorize
grayscale images and enhances the image quality. The
output images are labeled to allow consumers to identify
that these images have been processed and may not
accurately reflect the original colors.
Photo editing: A photographer uses photo editing software
(e.g., Photoshop) to edit model pictures for a magazine.
The final images are labeled to indicate that they are
post-processed. The labels allow to signal how “severe”
the changes are to distinguish simple contrast and tone
enhancements from changes where content has been
added, removed or modified.
V. REQUIREMENTS
Although still preliminary, based on the identified use
cases, a number of JPEG Fake Media requirements have been
identified and organized in two main categories, namely, the
modification description and the secure linking of modification
descriptions and media content. The sections below list the
already identified requirements for each identified category.
A. Modification description
• The standard shall provide means to describe how, by
who or when the content was created, generated and/or
modified.
• The standard shall provide means to describe the type
of modification, e.g., no modifications, transcoded, en-
hanced, restored, colorized, edited, composed, and deep
faked.
• The standard shall provide means to describe the purpose
of a modification.
• The standard shall provide means to describe (algorith-
mically or by humans) the probability of a modification.
• The standard shall provide means to describe the region
where the media asset was modified.
• The standard shall provide means to attach provenance
information to media assets.
• The standard shall provide means to keep track of the
history of media asset modifications.
• The standard shall provide means to compress embedded
descriptions.
• The standard shall provide means to embed references to
externally hosted descriptions.
B. Secure linking of modification descriptions and media
content
• The standard shall provide means to restrict access to
media asset metadata.
• The standard shall provide means to identify if the media
asset has been modified.
• The standard shall provide means to record and protect
IPR information and/or provenance information.
• The standard shall provide means to identify the origin
of the media asset.
• The standard shall provide means to verify the authentic-
ity of the media asset.
VI. ROADMAP FOR STANDARDIZATION: NEXT STEPS
The key steps in the definition of a new JPEG standard are
illustrated in Fig. 1. The process as depicted, follows a well
defined procedure composed of the following steps:
1) Inform and engage stakeholders
2) Collect relevant use cases
3) Assess and organize use cases
4) Define and cluster requirements from use cases
5) Define appropriate performance assessment processes and
metrics
6) Issue a Call for Proposals
Engagement with stakeholders is crucial to achieve a good
understanding of their specific use cases, requirements and
the challenges imposed by the latter. To this end, JPEG
already organised a 1st JPEG Fake Media Workshop3 and more
workshops will be organized to further complete the list of use
cases with related requirements and challenges.
Next in the process of creating of a standard is the defini-
tion and clustering the requirements that the standard should
comply to. At this point, as introduced in the previous section,
generic requirements have been identified in two categories:
31st JPEG Fake Media Workshop Proceedings, ISO/IEC JTC1/SC29/WG1,
wg1n90026, Online, December 15th, 2020.
Fig. 1: JPEG standardization process.
modification description and secure linkage of these descrip-
tions to the media content. These requirements will be further
refined to identify which requirements can be taken care of by
JPEG.
Based on the use cases and the final set of requirements,
a Call for Proposals will be issued, allowing experts to
propose technical solutions that address such requirements.
The Call for Proposals will include the appropriate assessment
processes and metrics that will be used to evaluate the received
proposals. After evaluation, the selected technical solutions
will be collaboratively improved and completed and might be
included in a new standard or might lead to extensions of
other relevant standards such as the JPEG Universal Metadata
Box Format (ISO/IEC 19566-5) or JPEG Privacy and Security
(ISO/IEC 19566-4).
VII. CONCLUSION
Nowadays, media assets can be modified or even entirely
generated in such a way that they are almost indistinguishable
from original assets. The existence of modified and generated
media have become much more common due to state-of-the-
art deep learning techniques that make it much faster and
accessible to create synthetic media. While this enables new
opportunities for creative usage, intentional or unintentional
spread of manipulated media may have serious consequences.
Providing consumers the ability to verify the origin and
provenance of media assets can alleviate these risks. However,
this can only be achieved if security, reliability and interop-
erability are guaranteed. In this context, this paper intends
to introduce the recently launched JPEG initiative to engage
with modified media stakeholders to explore usage scenarios
with good intention, as well as those with malicious intent.
From these usage scenarios, requirements are derived that will
eventually lead to the creation of a standard that facilitates
secure and reliable annotation of media asset generation and
modifications. Interested experts are invited to learn more
about the JPEG Fake Media initiative on the JPEG website4
and to get involved by participating in the discussions5 and
workshops.
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